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I. DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABILITY
During the Survey period, Texas courts released notable opinions re-
lated to individual liability for actions taken on behalf of a corporation. In
the first case, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed that a sole
owner of a corporate entity could not be personally liable for corporate
obligations under the alter ego theory. In the second case, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals clarified that, with respect to negotiable in-
struments, uncommunicated intent to sign a promissory note on behalf of
a company could subject the representative signatory to individual
liability.
A. THE EIGHTH EL PASO COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AGAINST PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR
OFFICERS OF ALTER EGO CORPORATE ENTITIES
Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) cre-
ates an affirmative defense limiting a corporate owner or shareholder’s
individual liability for obligations owed by the corporation, even if the
individual is, in effect, the alter ego of the corporation.1 In Valley Forge
Motor Co. v. Sifuentes,2 the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed
that the sole owner and employee of an incorporated car repair shop
could take advantage of this affirmative defense where the owner signed
documents on the shop’s behalf.
In this case, Valley Forge Motor Company (Valley Forge) leased a car
to Marcus Hill in February 2014. A few months later, in April 2014, Mr.
Hill was involved in a collision that required repairs to the car. Instead of
taking the car to Valley Forge, Mr. Hill had a tow company take the car to
Leo’s Auto Collision, Inc. (Leo’s) for repairs without Valley Forge’s
knowledge or authorization.3 When Mr. Hill did not return the vehicle,
Valley Forge filed a stolen vehicle report with the police in May 2014.4
1. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223.
2. 595 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).
3. Id. at 873.
4. Id.
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Over a year later, on July 8, 2015, Ruben Sifuentes signed and sent a
letter on behalf of Leo’s informing Mr. Hill that he owed $3,800.00 for car
repairs, and that Leo’s would file a mechanic’s lien on the vehicle if Mr.
Hill could not pay.5 Sifuentes included a copy of a repair estimate signed
by Mr. Hill on the date of the tow that authorized repairs worth
$3,800.00. The president of Valley Forge, Lee Urias, responded to the let-
ter, stating that Valley Forge owned the vehicle and had not authorized
car repairs by Leo’s. Urias warned that Valley Forge would take legal
action if the vehicle was not returned within seven days. About a week
later, Valley Forge received a letter from the El Paso County Tax As-
sessor stating that Leo’s notified the assessor’s office that it would file a
mechanic’s lien for $3,800.00.6 The letter stated that the vehicle would be
sold by public auction if the repairs were not paid or a lawsuit was not
filed within thirty-one days after Valley Forge was first notified of the
unpaid charges. Valley Forge took no action during this period, and Leo’s
foreclosed on the lien after the car was sold for $800.00 at a public auc-
tion. A notice in the assessor’s office showed that Sifuentes “appeared at
the sale as the authorized agent of Leo’s Auto Collision and authorized a
sale of the vehicle to himself.”7
Valley Forge filed a petition on October 28, 2015, naming Ruben
Sifuentes d/b/a Leo’s Auto Collision Inc. as the sole defendant, stating
that Sifuentes “may be served with process by serving its registered agent
Ruben Sifuentes.”8 The lawsuit alleged that “Defendant LEO’S AUTO
COLLISION INC. unlawfully and without authority assumed dominion
and control over Plaintiff’s vehicle.”9 Valley Forge later amended the pe-
tition but did not make changes to the parties or claims.10
Sifuentes filed an amended answer containing an affirmative defense
that he could not be sued in his individual capacity because he was em-
ployed as the president of the corporation, Sifu Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a
Leo’s Auto Collision.11 Sifuentes then moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that he could not be sued in his individual capacity as a
shareholder, director, or officer of a corporate entity pursuant to § 21.223
of the TBOC.12 Section 21.223 states that a holder, owner, or subscriber
of shares
may not be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect
to . . . any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter
relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder
. . . is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of actual
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 873–74.
8. Id. at 874.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (“[T]he amended answer asserted an affirmative defense that Sifuentes could
not be sued in an individual capacity because he was a shareholder, director, or officer of
the corporate entity known as ‘Sifu Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a/ Leo’s Auto Collision.’”).
12. Id.
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or constructive fraud . . . or other similar theory.13
The protection from individual liability is “exclusive and preempts any
other liability imposed for that obligation under common law or
otherwise.”14
Sifuentes produced summary judgment evidence that Sifu Enterprises
was incorporated as of April 2014, the date Leo’s took in the car for re-
pair. The Articles of Incorporation “named Sifuentes as the initial regis-
tered agent and director of Sifu Enterprises,” and the assumed name
certificate filed in October 2014 stated that Sifu Enterprises intended to
conduct business as Leo’s Auto Collision.15 In response, Valley Forge
claimed that the defendant used the names “RUBEN SIFUENTES and/
or LEO’S AUTO COLLISION INC.” to conduct business and place the
mechanics lien on the car.16 The district court granted Sifuentes’s motion
for summary judgment, and Valley Forge appealed.
The court of appeals addressed whether Sifuentes met his evidentiary
burden to establish the affirmative defense under § 21.223.17 The court
began its analysis by noting that the Texas Legislature recognized that
“an essential reason that entrepreneurs choose to incorporate their busi-
nesses” is to avoid personal liability and therefore “narrowly prescribed
the circumstances under which a shareholder can be held liable for corpo-
rate debts.”18 The court agreed with the district court that Sifuentes’s
summary judgment evidence established that he was a shareholder, direc-
tor, or officer of Sifu Enterprises, Inc., and that he conducted the business
at issue—repairs on Valley Forge’s car—on behalf of Leo’s Auto Colli-
sion, the assumed name of Sifu Enterprises, Inc.19 The burden then
shifted to Valley Forge to raise a fact issue challenging Sifuentes’s affirm-
ative defense.20
Valley Forge’s first argument that Sifuentes was an alter ego of Leo’s or
Sifu Enterprises was precluded by the language of § 21.223(a)(2).21 Valley
Forge then argued that Sifuentes used his individual name along with the
informal business name of Leo’s to conduct unauthorized repairs on Val-
ley Forge’s vehicle. The court did not agree that this argument raised a
fact issue with respect to whether Leo’s performed repairs on the car in
the ordinary course of business.22 The court noted that Sifuentes’s use of
his individual name “does nothing to negate the ultimate fact that Leo’s
was registered as the assumed name under which the corporate entity
operated.”23 The court held that Valley Forge failed to present evidence
13. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2).
14. Id. § 21.224.
15. Valley Forge Motor Co., 595 S.W.3d at 875.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 876.
18. Id. at 877 (citing Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271–72 (Tex. 2006)).
19. Id. at 878.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 879.
23. Id.
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“defeating any of the elements addressing whether Sifu Enterprises, Inc.
was a corporation, whether Sifuentes was properly affiliated with the cor-
poration . . . or whether Sifuentes was an alter ego of the corporation.”24
The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.25
Valley Forge affirms that sole operators of incorporated businesses are
as protected by the affirmative defense from personal liability as share-
holders and directors of larger multilevel corporations. Because one per-
son may be both the owner and sole employee of an incorporated
business, there may be a concern that such unity of control renders the
owner individually liable for corporate obligations. Sole proprietors or
independent contractors in Texas considering whether to incorporate
their businesses can be assured that they will not be individually liable for
their business obligations under the alter ego theory.
B. THE FOURTEENTH HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRED
PROOF THAT A REPRESENTATIVE COMMUNICATED INTENT
TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION TO
AVOID LIABILITY ON A PROMISSORY
NOTE
Section 3.402 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code governs the
liability of a representative signing a negotiable instrument, such as a
promissory note.26 In Zentech, Inc. v. Gunter,27 the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals addressed whether an agent could be liable for his sig-
nature on a promissory note if the note did not state that the agent was
signing in a representative capacity. The court held that the agent must
show that they communicated their intent to sign as a representative to
the other contracting party to avoid liability.28
In 2008 and 2009, S. Rao Guntur lent Zentech, Inc. (Zentech) a total of
$730,169.00 via two promissory notes (the Notes). While the Notes identi-
fied Zentech as the Borrower in the section titled “Borrower Informa-
tion,” the president of Zentech, Ramesh Maini, signed his name in the
blank designated for Borrower.29 Guntur moved for summary judgment
against both Zentech and Maini on the Notes, claiming that he was owed
the total amount with interest. On October 10, 2018, the trial court
granted summary judgment against Zentech and Maini “jointly and sev-
erally” for the full amount due on the Notes.30
On appeal, Zentech and Maini argued that the judgment should not
have been awarded against Maini because Maini was not referenced as
the Borrower on the Notes, and he signed and executed the Notes as the
president of Zentech. Section 3.402(b) states that when a representative
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.402.
27. 606 S.W.3d 847, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
28. Id. at 853–54.
29. Id. at 850–51.
30. Id. at 851.
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signs his own name on a negotiable instrument, the representative is not
liable “if the form of the signature shows unambiguously that the signa-
ture is made on behalf of the represented person who is identified in the
instrument.”31 However, if the form of the signature is ambiguous as to
whether the representative signed on behalf of another entity, “the repre-
sentative is liable on the instrument unless the representative proves that
the original parties did not intend the representative to be liable on the
instrument.”32
The court of appeals, citing comment 2 to § 3.402, held that Maini’s
signature did not “unambiguously refute personal liability,” and thus
Maini could only “escape liability by proving that Guntur and Maini did
not intend for Maini to be liable on the Notes.”33
To support appellants’ affirmative defense that Maini signed the notes
as a representative of Zentech, the court reasoned that appellants would
need to prove not only that Maini intended to sign as a representative,
but also that he disclosed his representative capacity to Guntur.34 The
court discussed two precedential cases where a party escaped summary
judgment for liability on a promissory note.35 In both Antil v. Southwest
Envelope36 and Eubank v. Myre Construction Company, Inc.,37 the par-
ties signing the promissory notes presented evidence that they disclosed
their status as president or officer of the corporation to the lender. Such
evidence was sufficient to defeat summary judgment by raising a fact is-
sue as to whether both parties to the promissory note understood that the
signatory was signing in a representative capacity.38
In the present case, Maini submitted an affidavit stating, “Guntur and I
have been Officers and Directors of Zentech through at least 2016. . . . At
the special request of, and agreement with, Guntur, I executed those doc-
uments [the Notes] as the President of Zentech. I did not execute them in
my individual capacity as Guntur has alleged.”39 The court found that this
affidavit evidenced that Guntur knew that Maini was the president of
Zentech and was signing the Notes as the president of Zentech.40 Moreo-
ver, the partial payments made on the Notes were made from the corpo-
rate account of Zentech. The court held that this evidence created a fact
issue “as to whether Guntur agreed and knew that Maini intended to sign
31. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.402(b)(1).
32. Id. § 3.402(b)(2).
33. Zentech, Inc., 606 S.W.3d at 853 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.402 cmt. 2
to explain that the signatory is liable if “the form of the signature does not unambiguously
refute personal liability.” However, the signatory “can escape liability by proving that the
original parties did not intend that he be liable on the note”).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 853–54.
36. 601 S.W.2d 47, 47–48 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ).
37. No. 05-93-01536-CV, 1995 WL 238568, at *124 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 24, 1995,
writ denied).
38. Zentech, Inc., 606 S.W.3d at 853–54.
39. Id. at 854.
40. Id.
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the Notes only as a representative of Zentech.”41 The court therefore re-
versed the trial court’s judgment against Maini and remanded for further
proceedings.42
Zentech is significant because it shows that a representative must use
caution when signing certain documents on behalf of the corporation.
Texas law governing liability for promissory note obligations requires an
unambiguous communication of representative status to the contracting
party to avoid liability on the note.43 Even if it appears obvious that a
representative is signing on behalf of the corporation listed as the obligor
on the promissory note, the representative must assert, preferably on the
note, that they do not intend to be liable in an individual capacity.44
II. HEALTHCARE LIABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
temporal interaction between two statutory provisions, both of which
limit a claimant’s recovery in a medical malpractice lawsuit. In the same
opinion, the supreme court also analyzed a trial court’s discretion to or-
der a division between lump sum and periodic payments under the Texas
Medical Leave Act (TMLA).
B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONCLUDED TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED SETTLEMENT CREDIT AND DAMAGES CAP UNDER
TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT
In 2003, the Texas Legislature enacted the TMLA, which provides for a
statutory limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice law-
suits.45 The TMLA, codified at Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§ 74, limits civil liability for noneconomic damages to $250,000.00 for
each claimant.46
Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code (CPRC) also limits
a claimant’s recovery in a healthcare liability claim if the claimant has
settled with one or more persons.47 Damages to be recovered by the
claimant in a healthcare liability claim are reduced—at the defendant’s
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 853 (quoting Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex. 1974)).
44. See id. at 852–54.
45. See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.01, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847
(codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301).
46. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.301. “Noneconomic damages” is defined in
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code as having “the meaning assigned
by section 41.001.” See id. § 74.001(a)(20); see id. § 41.001 (noneconomic damages defined
as “damages awarded for the purpose of compensating a claimant for physical pain and
suffering, mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical
impairment, loss of companionship and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind other than exemplary
damages.”).
47. Id. § 33.012(c).
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election—by (1) the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements, or (2) a
percentage equal to each settling person’s percentage of responsibility as
found by the trier of fact.48
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the interaction between
these two statutes concerning their application to damages awarded in
medical malpractice lawsuits. The events giving rise to Regent Care of San
Antonio, L.P. v. Detrick began when Robert Detrick “was admitted to
Regent Care . . . to receive short-term treatment for a rash prior to under-
going hip replacement surgery.”49 Mr. Detrick “began experiencing in-
continence after his admission” to Regent Care, but Regent Care’s nurses
“failed to notify his treating physicians” of these complications.50 Weeks
later, “when he could no longer feel or move his legs,” Mr. Detrick was
transferred to a hospital.51 At the hospital, “[a]n MRI revealed a tumor in
Detrick’s spinal canal that had compressed his spinal cord. His paralysis
proved to be permanent.”52
As a result, “Detrick and his wife (collectively, Detrick) sued Regent
Care,” a skilled nursing facility, claiming its nurses failed to notify De-
trick’s doctors of the change in his condition.53 “Detrick settled with all
defendants other than Regent Care for a total of $1,850,000.”
Following trial, the jury found that Regent Care and each of the set-
tling defendants were negligent and proximately caused Mr. Detrick’s in-
jury, and it apportioned 55% responsibility for the injury to Regent Care.
The jury awarded economic damages of $3 million for future medical ex-
penses, $390,000.00 for past medical expenses, and $245,000.00 for loss of
household services. It also awarded $10,250,000 in noneconomic
damages.54
Finally, the trial court “calculated that prejudgment interest on past
damages was $51,375.”55 The resulting amount of the verdict was
$13,936,375.00.56
“In applying the dollar-for-dollar settlement credit” of $1.85 million,
the trial court first applied the credit to the prejudgment interest.57 Then,
“the trial court calculated the percentages of economic versus
noneconomic damages awarded by the jury and allocated” the remaining
$1,798,625.00 credit using those relative percentages.58 As a result, 27%
48. See id. § 33.012(c)–(d) (“An election made under Subsection (c) shall be made by
any defendant filing a written election before the issues of the action are submitted to the
trier of fact and when made, shall be binding on all defendants.”).






55. Id. at 834.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893, 908 (Tex. 2005) (“A settlement
payment should be credited first to accrued prejudgment interest as of the date the settle-
ment payment was made . . . .”).
58. Detrick, 610 S.W.3d at 833.
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of the settlement credit ($485,629.00) was subtracted from economic
damages, and 73% of the settlement credit ($1,312,996.00) was subtracted
from noneconomic damages.59 “This reduction left Detrick a recovery of
$3,149,371 in economic damages and $8,937,004 in noneconomic dam-
ages.”60 The trial court then further reduced the noneconomic damages
from $8,937,004.00 to $250,000.00 as required by the TMLA, leaving a
total judgment of $3,399,371.00.61
“Regent Care appealed, challenging,” among other things, “the trial
court’s application of the settlement credit.”62 The Fourth San Antonio
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s application.63 Regent Care
then petitioned the supreme court for review.64 As a result, the question
before the supreme court was whether the trial court correctly applied
the settlement credit before imposing the statutory cap on noneconomic
damages.65
For its part, Regent Care asserted that the trial court should have allo-
cated and applied the settlement credit only after capping noneconomic
damages to $250,000.00.66 If the trial court first imposed the statutory cap
on noneconomic damages, 93% of the remaining settlement credit
($1,672,721.00) would have been subtracted from economic damages, and
7% of the settlement credit ($125,904.00) would have been subtracted
from the statutorily reduced noneconomic damages. This alternative ap-
plication would have left Detrick a recovery of $1,962,279.00 in economic
damages and $124,096.00 in noneconomic damages, totaling a judgment
of $2,086,375.00.
In support of its argument that the settlement credit should have been
applied after capping the noneconomic damages, Regent Care asserted
that, under Chapter 33.012 of the CPRC, “the amount received in settle-
ment must reduce the ‘damages to be recovered,’ not the damages
awarded by the jury.”67 Accordingly, Regent Care argued that the settle-
ment credit should have been applied to the $250,000.00 and not to the
full amount of noneconomic damages found by the jury.68 In addressing
Regent Care’s argument, the supreme court upheld the trial court’s appli-
cation of the settlement credit for two primary reasons.
First, the supreme court leaned on its analysis in an earlier decision, in
which it “considered whether a settlement must be offset before or after
applying the Texas Tort Claims Act’s damages cap.”69 In Trevino, a hospi-
tal authority argued that it was only liable for its liability cap minus the
59. Id. at 833, 835.
60. Id. at 835.
61. Id. at 833.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 834.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 835.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Tex. 1997)).
210 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
settlement amount.70 The court “rejected the Hospital Authority’s argu-
ment,” explaining that the damages “cap in the Tort Claims Act did not
‘circumscribe a plaintiff’s total recovery for a given injury.’”71 Instead, the
Trevino court took a consequentialist approach in determining the legis-
lature’s intent concerning that damages cap statute.72 The court observed
that a contrary application of the settlement credit (i.e., imposing the lia-
bility cap first) could completely bar recovery against a non-settling de-
fendant if a plaintiff settled with another defendant for more than the
applicable damages cap.73
Second, the supreme court directly addressed Regent Care’s plain lan-
guage argument, in which Regent Care asserted that Chapter 33 of the
CPRC mandates that settlement credits reduce “the amount of damages
to be recovered by the claimant.”74 The court explained that the TMLA
statute “limits an individual defendant’s ‘liability for noneconomic dam-
ages’; it does not address the total amount a claimant may recover from
all defendants and settling persons.”75 The court reasoned that Chapter
33 of the CPRC controls the claimant’s recovery while the TMLA gov-
erns the defendant’s liability.76 In short, “the ‘damages to be recovered
by the claimant’—the amount of damages found by the jury minus any
settlement credits—are independent of a defendant health care institu-
tion’s ‘limit of civil liability for noneconomic damages’ under the
TMLA.”77 Accordingly, the supreme court agreed with the court of ap-
peals and affirmed that the trial court properly applied the settlement
credit before imposing the TMLA damages cap.78
C. TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO
ORDER PERIODIC DAMAGES
Under § 74.503 of the TMLA, a trial court shall order future damages
be paid, in whole or in part, in periodic payments rather than by a lump-
sum payment if requested by a defendant or claimant.79 In ordering peri-
odic payments, a trial court must make a specific finding of the dollar
amount of periodic payments that will compensate the claimant for the
future damages, specifying the amount, number, timing, and recipient of
those payments.80
In other words, any division between lump-sum payments and periodic
payments of damages that will be “incurred after the date of judgment”





74. Id. at 835–36.




79. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.503(b).
80. Id. § 74.503(c)–(d).
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payments has the burden to identify for the trial court evidence regarding
each of the findings required by section 74.503, and the findings must be
supported by sufficient evidence.81
In its second issue, Regent Care asserted the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by ordering that $256,358.00 in future damages be paid periodi-
cally.82 “The jury found that $3 million, ‘if paid now in cash,’ would
compensate Detrick for his future medical expenses.”83 After trial, Re-
gent Care requested the trial court to order payment of the jury’s entire
award periodically over five to eight years.84
The trial court first subtracted Detrick’s attorney’s fees and expenses,
leaving a remainder of $1,256,358.00.85 From there, the trial court then
ordered Regent Care pay $1 million in a lump-sum payment and the
residual $256,358.00 in twenty-four monthly installments.86 Regent Care
argued that the trial court’s division between the lump-sum payment ($1
million) and periodic payments ($256,358.00) was not supported by suffi-
cient evidence in the record.87
Applying the principles set out under § 74.503, the supreme court
agreed with Regent Care that the trial court’s order concerning periodic
payments was not supported by sufficient evidence.88 Nevertheless, the
supreme court concluded that Regent Care was not entitled to reversal of
the $1 million lump-sum payment because it “did not point the court to
any evidence supporting its request that the entire $3 million award be
paid periodically, nor to evidence of any specific dollar amount of medi-
cal expenses that would be incurred periodically.”89 Further, the supreme
court reasoned that “simply ordering the jury’s present-value damages
award to be paid in periodic installments—whether in whole or in part—
would be an abuse of discretion here because it would effectively ‘double
discount’ the award, undercompensating him for the expenses he would
incur in each future period.”90 Critical to the supreme court’s holding was
that Regent Care had the burden to identify evidence to support an order
for periodic payments and failed to do so.91
In Columbia Valley Healthcare System L.P. v. Andrade, the Thirteenth
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals applied the Texas Supreme
Court’s analysis in Regent Care, stating that “any division between lump-
sum payments and periodic payments” must be supported by evidence in
81. Detrick, 610 S.W.3d at 837 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.501(1)).
82. Id. at 836.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 838.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 837–38.
88. Id. at 838.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.503(c)).
91. Id. at 837–39.
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the record.92 In that case, the trial court awarded “five ‘periodic pay-
ments in the amount of $604,000’” per year and “one lump-sum payment
of $7,310,000 in cash.”93 On appeal, Columbia Valley “argue[d] that the
trial court’s division between the lump sum and periodic payments disre-
garded the jury’s findings.”94 In its analysis, the court of appeals distin-
guished its case from Regent Care because both parties in Columbia
Valley submitted evidence to support periodic future payments.95 As a
result, the trial court’s order of periodic payments was based on sufficient
evidence and thus upheld.96
Interestingly, Columbia Valley also “argue[d] that the trial court erred
by refusing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.”97 The appellate
court noted that “findings of fact and conclusions of law are generally
only required when requested by a party in a case tried in the district or
county court without a jury.”98 Additionally, the appellate court con-
cluded that “Regent did not hold that a trial court’s ordering of periodic
payments must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.”99
Instead, the appellate court interpreted Regent Care for the proposition
that “the division between the lump sum and periodic payments needed
to be based on evidence in the record.”100
III. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued two opin-
ions relating to tolling statute of limitations periods in legal malpractice
claims.101
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT HELD THAT LEGAL ADVICE THAT
IS ONLY TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO A PROSECUTION OR DEFENSE
OF A CLAIM CANNOT BE TOLLED UNDER THE HUGHES STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS RULE
1. Another Look at the Hughes Rule
In Erikson v. Renda, the Texas Supreme Court reexamined the long-
standing Hughes tolling rule regarding statutes of limitations.102 The
Hughes tolling rule provides that attorney malpractice claims that involve
the attorney’s “prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation”
92. Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys. L.P. v. Andrade ex rel., No. 13-18-00362-CV,




95. Id. at *7.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 296).
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. See Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Tex. 2019); Gray v. Skelton, 595
S.W.3d 633, 635 (Tex. 2020).
102. Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 559.
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are tolled until all appeals have been exhausted.103 First, the supreme
court provided clarity as to whether the Hughes rule’s applicability
should be determined on a case-by-case basis, or whether it categorically
applies to all cases within the definition of legal malpractice committed in
the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation.104 The su-
preme court mandated that Hughes should have a strict application and
be categorically applied to all cases that fall within its definition.105 The
categorical approach means courts should not evaluate the policy reasons
of the rule when applying it and instead use a bright-line approach to
ensure “predictability and consistency.”106 Second, the supreme court re-
jected any approach to broaden the Hughes rule, reasoning that it would
give plaintiffs unlimited reach without fair notice to attorney defend-
ants.107 Limitations periods serve the function of providing a reasonable
time for plaintiffs to bring their claims while balancing avoidance of stale
claims and prejudice to defendants.108
The supreme court in Erikson reiterated the Hughes standard that legal
malpractice claims’ limitations periods are equitably tolled when the ac-
tions giving rise to the malpractice claim were committed in the prosecu-
tion or defense of a claim that resulted in litigation,109 and provided
guidance as to what falls within the boundaries of the rule. Specifically,
the supreme court emphasized that not every legal malpractice claim that
results in litigation will fall under the auspice of Hughes.110 The “critical
limitation” is that the malpractice must be committed “in the prosecution
or defense of a claim.”111
2. Erikson’s Holding that Legal Work Incidental to Litigation Does
Not Fall Under Hughes
In Erikson, the supreme court held that the legal advice at issue was
not within the ambit of the Hughes tolling rule because it was only tan-
gentially related to the prosecution or defense of a claim.112 The underly-
ing dispute involved legal advice from an attorney purportedly blessing
asset transfers in connection with resolving debt obligations.113 The attor-
ney advised that the client should pursue transferring its assets to elimi-
nate debt obligations with creditors, rather than filing for bankruptcy.114
The debt obligations stemmed from litigation where a company was
found liable to the U.S. government and was in a precarious financial
103. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991).
104. Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 565–66.
105. Id. at 566.
106. Id. (quoting Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. 2001)).
107. Id. at 569.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 563–64.
110. Id. at 566.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 559.
113. Id. at 566.
114. Id. at 560.
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situation.115 Notably, the attorney did not represent the client in the liti-
gation that brought these debt obligations.116 The supreme court held
that the advice about the asset transfers was only tangentially related to
the underlying claims that brought about the debt obligations and refused
to broaden Hughes’s reach, rejecting a broad interpretation of what it
means for legal malpractice to “aris[e] from,” “relat[e] to,” or “connect[ ]
with” a claim’s defense or prosecution.117
The attorney’s legal advice in Erikson was incidental and tenuously re-
lated to the litigation that brought about the debt obligations which trig-
gered the client’s need to transfer assets to creditors.118 As the supreme
court explained, litigation comes with many “ripple effects” and ex-
panding the application of Hughes to include legal services that might
have a tangential relationship to litigation would be an unreasonable ex-
pansion of the Hughes judicial exception to statutes of limitations.119 If
legal work is only “incidentally related to activities undertaken to prose-
cute or defend a claim” it is not within the realm of the Hughes rule.120
B. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT CLARIFIED THE MEANING OF
“EXONERATED” UNDER ITS PEELER HOLDING AND ITS IMPLICATION
UNDER HUGHES’S EQUITABLE TOLLING PRINCIPLES
1. Exoneration Under the Peeler Doctrine Requires Proof of Innocence
In Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, a plurality of the Texas Supreme Court
held that in order for a client convicted of a criminal charge to pursue a
legal malpractice claim, the client must first obtain exoneration.121 The
Peeler court did not define “exoneration,” leaving the question open as to
whether it constitutes establishing actual innocence or something else.122
The supreme court answered that open question in Gray v. Skelton and
held that exoneration under the Peeler doctrine requires proof of actual
innocence.123 Accordingly, a finding of innocence is a predicate to any
legal malpractice claim, even if a client’s criminal conviction has been
vacated.124
Innocence can be demonstrated in different ways.125 Innocence may be
established when a criminal conviction is vacated because of an actual
innocence finding, or if the conviction is vacated on grounds other than
an actual-innocence finding, it can be proven in a malpractice suit against
a criminal defense attorney.126 Either way, innocence must be the crux of
115. Id.
116. Id. at 566.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 568.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497–98 (Tex. 1995).
122. See id. at 497.
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the consideration in analyzing “exoneration” under Peeler.127 The su-
preme court emphasized that vacating a conviction is not equivalent to
exoneration.128 For example, a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel
is grounds to vacate a conviction, but does not demonstrate a criminal
defendant’s innocence.129 A criminal defendant’s counsel falling below
constitutional standards under the Sixth Amendment does not mean that
the criminal defendant is innocent of the underlying crime—it means that
the conviction is not constitutionally sufficient.130 Moreover, the supreme
court emphasized that exoneration requires an affirmative act.131
The exoneration requirement in Peeler stems from the overarching
concept of proximate cause.132 Convicted criminals who want to pursue
legal malpractice claims against their defense attorneys have to overcome
“the proximate cause bar,” and they do so by being “exonerated.”133
Without exoneration, a criminal defendant cannot demonstrate that it
was the attorney’s negligence rather than the defendant’s own illegal or
criminal conduct that proximately caused the conviction.134
Traditional legal malpractice claims require a showing that the lawyer
owed a duty of care to the client, that duty was breached, and the breach
proximately caused damage.135 In Gray, the supreme court added an-
other element to a malpractice claim if an individual’s conviction was va-
cated on grounds other than actual innocence—“[t]hey must obtain a
finding of their innocence as a predicate to the submission of their legal-
malpractice claim.”136 Accordingly, any submission of a legal malpractice
claim by convicted criminals should be “conditioned on an affirmative
finding that the malpractice plaintiffs are innocent of the crime of which
they were formerly convicted” and the standard will be by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.137
2. Equitable Tolling Under the Hughes Doctrine Is Not Limited to the
Habeas Application Process but Includes the Period by
Which a Criminal Defendant’s Case Is Pending a
New Trial or the State’s Prosecution
As discussed earlier, the Hughes doctrine is an equitable tolling rule
that provides that attorney malpractice claims involving the attorney’s
127. See id. at 637–39 (describing the plurality and dissent’s repeated references to the
word “innocence” in the Peeler decision).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 638.
130. Id.
131. Id. (defining exoneration as “[t]he clearing of someone’s name after that person
has been accused of blameworthy conduct or wrongdoing” (citing Exoneration, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019))).
132. Id. at 637 (“At its core, the Peeler doctrine rests on the notion of proximate
cause.”).
133. Id. at 635 (citing Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498).
134. Id. at 638.
135. See id. at 639 (citing Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 400 (Tex. 2017)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation are tolled until
all appeals have been exhausted.138 The supreme court in Gray explained
that this tolling period includes the period after a habeas application,
which is when a criminal defendant is awaiting the state’s prosecution and
pending a new trial.139 This is because habeas relief does not end a crimi-
nal case against a defendant, but “merely vacate[s] the original convic-
tion.”140 After a criminal defendant’s conviction is vacated, charges may
still materialize; thus, a criminal defendant’s potential “malpractice claim
remain[s] captive to the possibility of a second prosecution and convic-
tion that might likewise bar her malpractice claim.”141 Leaving this open
would put the criminal defendant’s ability to seek a malpractice claim
against her attorney in the hands of the state, and would unfairly risk
exceeding time limitations because of the state’s delay or indecision to
prosecute.142 Accordingly, equitable tolling principles and the standard
under Hughes require limitations to be tolled after the habeas application
process, and until litigation is finally concluded.143
138. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991).
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